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Family Prestige as Old-Age Security: 










This paper aims at studying the self-enforcing family contract between a migrant 
son and his ageing father who remained in the village and expects to receive 
support. In 2004, a household survey conducted in the Senegal River Valley was 
especially designed to account for the complex socio-political structure of the 
local institutions. The empirical results suggest that the social rank of the family 
within the  village  is  a  key  to  the  enforcement  mechanisms  at  work.  Indeed, 
while belonging to a prestigious family lowers the probability of migrating, it 
raises the probability of frequently remitting to the patriarch. Conversely, sons 
from historically disadvantaged groups are more likely to both migrate and cut 
ties with their village of origin, including their family. Additional qualitative 
evidence is rather suggestive  that  despite  their  economic  success,  low status 
migrants keep being stigmatized in their village of origin. Hence, inheriting his 
father's  dominant  position  in  the  village  represents  a  strong  incentive  for  a 
migrant  son  from  a  high-ranked  family  to  remit.  Under  such  circumstances, 
patriarchs from prestigious families only, can actually rely on their migrating 
sons as old-age security. 
 
Keywords: Migration; Old-Age Support; Caste; Senegal River Valley 
JEL Classification: O12; D12; J62 
                                                 
1 TSE-ARQADE Université des Sciences Sociales, Manufacture des Tabacs - Aile J-J L. 21, allées de Brienne 
31000 Toulouse, France; jean-luc.demonsant@univ-tlse1.fr. During my research in Senegal, I benefited from 
financial supports from both the ministry in charge of Higher Education (Aires Culturelles grant, 2001) and 
the ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lavoisier grant, 2003-04). First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, 
Jean-Paul  Azam  for  his  continuous  support  and  insightful  suggestions.  I  also  benefited  from  fruitful 
discussions with Flore Gubert, Robert H. Bates, Jean Schmitz and Issiaka-P. L. Lalèyê. I am very thankful to 
many  seminar  participants,  and  more  specifically  to:  ARQADE  colleagues  for  providing  very  useful 
feedbacks, François-Charles Wolff for the efficient econometric tips, and Philippe Antoine for allowing me 
realizing how sensitive interdisciplinary approaches are. Last but not least, I am extremely grateful to Monica 
Ramirez, Anthony Stenton and Ahmed Tritah for doing a great job in tidying up stylistic mistakes and making 
relevant comments on previous versions of this paper. I am solely responsible for all remaining omissions or 
errors.   2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Few years ago, working on old-age support in Africa sounded rather strange. This is mainly 
due to two preconceived ideas: first the continent is not concerned with ageing issues, 
second the myth of the „vieux sage‟ still pervasive, and has prevented thorough scientific 
studies on their actual situation. In 1994, the World Bank sent a warning about global 
ageing: Africa was no exception as the share of people over 60 year old was forecasted to 
double in the next 25 years. On the other hand, respect towards elders is believed to be 
working well in Africa, though there is a greater awareness about cases of elderly abuse. 
Miguel (2003), for instance, analyzed the extreme situation in which elderly widows of 
Tanzania were either killed or expelled in times of hardships. In a poor agrarian economy, 
food  scarcity  tends  to  favor  most  productive  members  over  young  children  or  elders. 
Whereas children will soon become productive, elders do not seem to be in a position to 
reciprocate. Nonetheless the livelihoods of the elderly mainly rely on the support of the 
kinship group, and more likely the children in most developing countries. 
 
From  an  economist  point  of  view,  there  is  an  informal  familial  contract  between  the 
migrant adult son and his father. Though not denied to play a role, love and sense of duty 
alone do not provide credible enough incentives for the contract to be self-enforcing. This 
paper aims at finding out what enforcement mechanisms exist to make them abide by this 
informal contract despite geographical distance. Why do migrants send substantial parts of 
their earnings to their ageing parents who stayed behind in the village? What are the young 
migrant incentives not to renege on such contract? What do older parents actually have to 
offer in return? Based on an original survey conducted in 2004, around Matam, Senegal, 
empirical evidence indicate that within the traditional village society both migration and 
remittance decisions of a son are linked with the social ranking of his father.
2 
 
In their seminal paper Coate and Ravallion (1993) develop a theoretical model of solidarity 
networks in a village economy, formalizing Fafchamps (1992), giving the rationale behind 
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the  sustainability  of  the  reciprocity  without  any  commitment.  Facing  the  same  ex-ante 
idiosyncratic risks, villagers help each other today, keeping in mind that it could well be the 
other way around tomorrow. In comparison, economic theory does not provide a unified 
framework  regarding  the  enforcement  mechanisms  in  the  case  of  children  providing 
support to their elderly parents. Indeed, the reciprocity vanishes, as old parents are not in a 
position to reciprocate, yet some commitment exists. Laferrère and Wolff (2006) present a 
great variety of both theoretical and empirical microeconomic models on family transfers in 
general  and  the  “children  as  old-age  security”  model  in  particular.  In  reality  many 
mechanisms come into play at the same time, depending on the physical constraints as well 
as the cultural context. 
Ex-ante, economies of scales at the household level suggest that ageing parents should co-
reside with their children, and indeed, intergenerational coresidence is quite common in 
developing countries.
3 However, low-income rural areas are risky environments, and once 
this feature is taken into account, sending a family member away in order to provide 
support  for  the  family  in  times  of  hardships  seems  a  much  better  response.  The  „new 
economics  of  migration‟  lead  by  Oded  Stark  (1990)  views  migration  as  one  of  family 
strategies to cope with a risky environment. This has been well documented in theoretical 
and empirical literature on the economics of migration and remittances.
4 
Nonetheless, there remains an unsolved rationality  problem: if the gains are obvious from 
the family viewpoint, it is less clear when turning to migrant‟s point of view. Indeed, why 
wouldn‟t he simply renege on the familial arrangements? The issue becomes even more 
striking when turning to the motivations of a young migrant providing support to his family 
left behind who primarily consists of his old parents. They do not seem to be in a position 
to assist him in return as the mutual insurance contract stipulates, in case of unemployment 
for  instance.  A  classical  motive  invoked  is  the  “strategic  bequest  motive”
5:  children 
compete for parents‟ inheritance. In this view, parents can threaten their children not to 
bequest them anything if they had not being supportive. Accordingly, young children remit 
to secure their bequest. In Botswana, Lucas and Stark (1985) found that wealthier families 
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in terms of cattle ownership receive more remittances. Hoddinott (1994) tested this model 
on  rural  Kenyan  data,  and  found  remittances  responsive  to  bequeathable  lands.  What 
happens then in a changing society when land or cattle ownership are no longer sought 
after? Furthermore, in most countries, inheritance division is settled by law. Under such 
circumstances, this mechanism doesn‟t seem credible anymore. 
Since my first field trip in rural Senegal, I have had the opportunity to witness the influence 
that the former caste system still has in the decision-making process of any villager in both 
public  and  private  spheres.  However  economic  studies  in  Africa  have  usually  put  the 
emphasis on ethnic diversity, rarely incorporating social divisions within ethnic groups. 
Rephrasing Christopher Udry, I decided “mixing methods” confronting economic theory to 
other  social  sciences  and  direct  observations  from  repeated  fieldworks  in  Senegal,  and 
among  the  Senegalese  migrants  here  in  France.
6  Having control over the whole data 
collection process from the questionnaire design to the choice of trusted enumerators, gives 
precise knowledge of the reliability of such sensitive variables as caste status. 
After briefly describing the cultural context of the fieldwork, i.e. the Haalpulaaren of the 
Senegal River Middle Valley, I will describe the theoretical framework placing the role of 
family prestige as a central enforcement device for the old -age support arrangements. The 
next section  exposes  the empirical strategy  -  from the data collection process to the 
econometric specification - developed to highlight the relevance of this hypothesis. After 
presenting the results based on the household survey,  along with additional qualitative 
evidence that support this scenario, I conclude with some policy implications on migration 
and development. 
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MATAM AND THE HAALPULAAR SOCIETY 
 
Constraints from the physical environment on one hand, and the cultural context of the area 
on the other hand, make the “strategic bequest motive” not relevant. I collected data on 
remittance behavior in the Senegal middle valley where migration has long been considered 
a better strategy than working in the local agriculture sector. In this context, the return of 
„physical‟ bequests has become close to insignificant for a migrant son. 
 
A non-profitable environment 
 
Less  than  a  century  ago,  the  middle  valley  was  relatively  prosperous  and  therefore 
economically attractive. The keys to success were the navigability of the river, the cattle 
breeding and fishing activities along with the existence of two harvest seasons in October 
and in March. Rain-fed agriculture in the semi-arid highlands combined with the flood-fed 
culture by the river banks allowed such prosperity. 
Several factors contributed to render any agricultural activity very risky and almost not 
profitable at all. Since World War II, the region has a long tradition of migration: repeated 
droughts in the seventies and eighties accelerated the phenomenon. To curb rural exodus, 
the French during colonization, and the state after independence, both invested in huge 
irrigation projects, and dams. Irrigation provides year-around crops and the dam is planned 
to provide electricity to the three neighboring countries, i.e. Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. 
However the results are mitigated as the power supply objective is not compatible with 
natural floods cycles. Moreover, the cost of oil and maintenance for motor-pumps, along 
with the cost of fertilizers and seeds make it profitable for rich farmers or efficient peasant 
cooperatives only. The zone is also very remote, and the national road linking Saint-Louis 
to Matam has never been seriously maintained so that the local production cannot easily 
reach  the  urban  sectors.  For  the  vast  majority  of  the  peasants  of  the  valley  it  remains 
impossible to make a self-sustainable business out of it. As a consequence, nowadays, there 
are many schemes and water supplies that are badly-kept. In fact, conventional wisdom   6 
admits that it is rather difficult to make a decent living out of agricultural activities in the 
valley. In the meantime, migrants engage in conspicuous consumption either for religious 
celebrations or in housing, after just a few years abroad. 
 
The cultural context: a pervading caste system 
 
Some  historical  background  on  the  Haalpulaaren,  who  represent  the  majority  of  the 
population of the area, formerly known as Fuuta Tooro, can be found in Wane (1969). The 
Haalpulaaren  are  responsible  for  spreading  Islam  all  over  West-Africa,  and  are  highly 
respected for that in the country and the sub-region. They are rigorous Muslim followers. 
This gives an additional argument against the “strategic bequest motive”, as Islam has very 
precise inheritance sharing rules: a son gets one share and a daughter gets half a share. 
At the political level, if the administrative system is inherited from the French one, villages 
have remained in the hand of the traditional chiefs. Descending from religious or political 
figureheads of the Fuuta is the most sought-after social recognition. Another very important 
aspect of the family prestige is determined by which social category the family belongs to. 
Traditional Haalpulaar society, like many Sahelian societies, (see Tamari, 1991) is based on 
a division into three main social categories: 
1.  The „free born‟ is the largest yet the most heterogeneous group as both nobles and 
commoners can be found. 
2.  The  artisans  and  musicians  who  are  free  but  economically  dependent  on  their 
patrons.  The  most  representative  ones  being  the  griots  (in  French):  the  praise-
singers. 
3.  The (descendants of) slaves, who despite the fact that both Islam and the 1905 law 
have abolished slavery, continue to suffer from many discriminations. 
To get a better idea about the complexity of this system, go to table A.1 in the appendix 
where more detailed explanations are given. In reality, the use of the term „caste‟ is rather 
controversial, as it usually refers to the different artisan social sub-categories: les castés in 
French. In this paper, I refer to „the caste system‟ as the whole stratified social organization.   7 
It is clear that all these social categories were not fixed, but that they evolved as some 
commoners  have  strategically  been  conferred  a  title  of  nobility  as  a  reward  for  good 
services, or new warriors recruited among former slaves. It is important to keep in mind 
that these categories corresponded to a genuine need for a specific job allocation during the 
former  era.  The  official  abolition  of  slavery  along  with  the  emergence  of  the  modern 
market economy render this classification outdated on practical grounds. Likewise, artisans 
do  not  necessarily  work  in  the  branch  of  their  group‟s  specialization,  though  both  the 
artisans and the descendants of slaves still suffer from discriminations nowadays. They 
mainly consist of marriage constraints, as well as denied access to land, and to political and 
religious leadership.
7 Indeed at the political level, if the administrative system is absolutely 
similar to the French one, villages have remained in the hand of the traditional chiefs. It is 
really striking how relevant this classification remains in contemporary Haalpulaar culture. 
In this traditional view, your birth determines your personality (cf. Wane 1969 who depicts 
each caste with a specific personal trait). It is said for instance that one should not trust an 
artisan because he may just be trying to seduce oneself in order to receive gifts. Not 
knowing the whole genealogy of one‟s family is also a problem: it is the case that former 
slaves in particular have lost track of their ancestors... The role played by this caste system 
appears in everyday life, as there is a set of implicit rules that each group must follow, 
driven by „the sense of honor‟ which is specific to the nobles. There are many ways for 
higher status individuals to distinguish themselves from lower status ones.
8 At the core of 
the noble‟s code of honor, is the importance of always being in the position of giving and 
never asking. It is by giving and being publicly generous that the noble will be able to 
demonstrate his worthiness. When belonging to such families it is an unbearable shame to 
have  economic  difficulties.  There  are  great  pressures  to  display  generous  behavior. 
Maintaining a high social status is expensive as it means giving to their griots and many 
clients (former slaves, artisans...). The size of the clientele represents the power of the 
family. Along with the warm-glow effect of giving, griots directly raise the utility of the 
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giver by advertising his generosity, which directly improves his reputation
9. Aristocratic 
families still ought to give to their former clientele during baptisms, weddings and religious 
events. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: „THE SYMBOLIC BARAKA MOTIVE‟ 
 
In  a  stratified  society  ruled  as  a  gerontocracy,  an  old  man  may  benefit  from  an 
advantageous position in local politics if and only if he belongs to a high ranked family. 
Few families have a say in choosing the village leader, and even less have a chance to 
become  one.  Hence,  the  family  name  becomes  a  valuable  symbolic  bequest  for  such 
important families. At the same time, it is well known that nowadays, many former slaves, 
or bards take advantage of their position too, and like to remind their former masters of 
their duty to provide them with gifts. Thus respecting this social pressure to give requires 
high income. Migration appears as a solution to finance these conspicuous expenses. 
Conducting  focus  groups  and  individual  interviews,  I  was  told  many  times  during  my 
investigations - both in France among the Diaspora, and in Senegal - that a very strong 
motivation for remitting is to earn blessings and prayers for felicity. Here religion and 
traditional beliefs interfere. Indeed there are some mystical practices in Haalpulaar, Wolof 
and Serer traditions, consisting in calling the migrant to come back home (Sylla & M'Baye 
1991). There are legends about migrants coming back home in a rush and losing memory of 
how this happened and then going insane. This is said to be adapted as a last resort, as 
retaliation  for  an  unreliable  son.  Repeatedly  the  importance  of  being  near  your  dying 
parents as they will transmit the baraka of the whole dynasty through their last blessing, 
was raised.
10 Indeed a dying old man will call his beloved sons, and give them his final 
blessing: the duhahu - in Pulaar - which transmits barka - in Pulaar. This Islamic word 
could roughly be translated as Allah‟s blessing, and it has strong influence throughout the 
whole Islamic world. It is important to bear in mind that it is strongly linked to good luck, 
wealth, happiness, health, fertility, and social success. Baraka can be acquired hereditarily 
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through genealogical link to saints, or their contacts (see Schmitz, 2000), but also by a strict 
observance of the five pillars of Islam. It can be transmitted by blessings. Being old and a 
well known good Muslim puts oneself in a good position to have some. 
Since  living  abroad  makes  it  rather  difficult  to  be  physically  near  your  dying  parents, 
sending money appears as one practical alternative. Of course, the value of this baraka in 
the eyes of the migrant strongly depends on the notability of his patriarch and consequently 
on the status of the family. Obviously belonging to a prestigious family yields considerable 
returns in terms of prospects for marriage and political position in the village. While on 
migration, he could also benefit from the status of the family to rely on migrants from the 
same village. Besides, migrants from the same village usually live in neighboring rooms in 
workers‟ hostels - foyers de travailleurs in French - reconstituting the village society. It has 
been repeatedly suggested that this is a way of reproducing hierarchic village society (e.g. 
see Ba 1996: 207). In other geographic areas, Whitehouse (1994) describes baraka as one 
motive for returning migrants among Soninke in Mali. Again, remitting can be a way for 
the migrant to pay tribute to the village stratified socio-political structure. 
Back to the economic literature, Lucas and Stark (1985) had mentioned that reputation 
concerns play an important role too. In their view, the migrant may remit „to enhance 
prestige or political influence‟ for the days when he will return. Taking good care of one‟s 
parents is a hallmark of reliability. This could for example be an incentive for migrants 
seeking wives within the community. The loss of prestige incurred by defaulting sons could 
also prevent their return for retirement, which is central to many African migrants. Last but 
not least, the desire to be buried at home is an additional motive to maintain the social 
status of the family. It is essential for many Muslim migrants, and in particular those from 
the Senegal River Valley. The main concern is more a deep attachment to homeland, than 
religious  grounds.  Many  migrants  associations  were  indeed  created  in  order  to  collect 
money for the repatriation of dead bodies.
11 
Aware that it may not be the only mechanism at work, I will emphasize here the role of 
social status. In a patriarchal stratified society. Within the family the patriarch is the 
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decision-maker. At the village level, there are two groups of families: the nobles and the 
others  (non-nobles).  Only  the  patriarchs  from  noble  families  can  accede  to  influential 
positions.  To  deserve  their  advantageous  dominant  position,  the  nobles  must  pay  non-
nobles substantial gifts in monetary terms. The non-nobles who benefit from these transfers 
must in return renounce basic human rights: not choose a spouse among the nobles, give up 
their political ambitions, and admit the superiority of the nobles in community decision-
making. There is an implicit family contract between the patriarch and his adult sons. The 
patriarch  sends  his  most  promising  sons  on  migration,  expecting  them  to  remit.  The 
motivation of migrant sons is to obtain the father‟s position on their return. In this view, 
remittances should be observed for high ranked migrants only. The migration of the lower 
status migrants relates to other motivations: trading monetary gifts for social mobility. They 
will loosen ties with their community, and make their new life abroad, taking advantage of 
the anonymity of city life. 






Of course, the link between the migrant and his relatives who stayed behind is central to 
understanding remittance behavior. This is not an issue in my study, since I focused on the 
case of sons remitting to their ageing father. So, in the survey sample, all migrants have in 
common that their father is alive and lives in the village. Hence, remittances are interpreted 
as old-age support from the migrant sons. 
The survey was conducted just before the rainy season from April to June 2004, when 
weather conditions are particularly tough. It is a time of drought and food scarcity as the 
granaries are empty. The good thing is that since peasants are preparing the fields for the 
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rain cultivations, all members of the household who are away, but within reach, come back 
to give a hand. 
The survey covers 149 patriarchs over six villages randomly chosen around Matam.
13 Three 
are located by the Senegal river, in the so-called waalo region, the other three are located 
approximately 10 km away from the river, in the jeeri region, one of them being right by 
the highway (the others being 4km away on a dirt track). Waalo villages are isolated (at 
least) 3 months a year during the rainy season as roads become unfit for vehicles, which 
can only be reached by pirogues (2-3 hour instead of 20 minute ride during the dry season). 
Jeeri villagers do not own irrigated lands which are located near the river, but some noble 
families do own waalo lands by the river. 
It is an exhaustive survey, as all the men of the selected villages who met chosen criteria 
were selected. The criteria are that they must be born before 1939, and that their eldest 
living son should have been born before 1979. Information was gathered at three levels: 
  The patriarch level: Information on both his social status and his living conditions 
were gathered. To measure social status information on the family background were 
gathered such as which caste it belongs to, the family tenure in the village, the 
political  and  religious  role  played  by  the  patriarch  and  his  father.  Then  much 
emphasis was put on where the patriarch gets support from, but also on his wealth 
(housing, fields, cattle, belongings...), health, nutrition, education, past migrations 
and economic activities. 
  The household level: I define a household as a unit of consumption and income 
sharing (as sometimes several households can co-reside in the same compound), 
which can be made of several nuclear family units.
14 I collected very precise family 
links between household members, and some basic information on each one, such 
as: education level, economic activity, sources of revenue... 
  Finally, information on each child has been collected. Special attention was given to 
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children living outside the household, for which I gathered indirect information with 
spouses, mother, siblings, or the father. The main focus was on remittances sent by 
migrant sons to their old father, and the rest of the family. Information on news and 
visits given to the family were also collected. 
 
Much  effort  was  put  on  making  sure  to  have  at  hand  the  most  precise  and  reliable 
information on the social status of the families. For double-checking purposes, the status of 
the family was  gathered twice.  First,  I  obtained the information  directly  by  asking the 
patriarch, then indirectly, on a second round, asking informants (mainly the village chief). 
As it can be a very sensitive subject, the question was asked towards the end of the survey, 
in order to prevent the patriarch from being offended or upset, or even from refusing to be 
surveyed. The question was asked among a series of question on historical background of 
the family, to make it sound like the family „social origin‟. For the same reasons, I dared to 
ask  the  village  chief  about  the  status  of  my  surveyed  families,  on  a  second  round  in 




A detailed table of descriptive statistics for the initial sample, the migrants and the remitters 
is shown in table A.2 in the appendix. 
Social composition of the sample 
 
Only the sons of the patriarchs above 16 years old were considered as potential old-age 
support providers. There are 470 adult sons in the initial sample. 45% are on migration. 
Among the migrants, 62% regularly remit. It is noteworthy that only 66% of the migrants 
belong  to  „free-born‟  families,  whereas  they  represent  71%  of  the  remitters.  Table  1 
displays the caste composition of the different samples studied: 
     13 
 
Table 1: Caste composition of samples of interest 
 
Categories  Patriarchs (%)  All sons  Migrants (%)  Remitters (%) 
   (N=147)  (N=470)  (N=213)  (N=133) 
Free Men  70.1  72.1  65.7  70.7 
Artisans  12.9  11.7  16.9  15.8 
Slaves  17.0  16.2  17.4  13.5 
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  the  largest  caste  is  the  „free  men‟  category,  which  encompasses 
aristocrats as well as commoners. To differentiate them, the list of notables was collected 
from our informants. As le conseil des sages is supposed to be composed of the elderly men 
of the village, barely 40% of them were designed as „notables‟. They represent the actual 




The destination distribution is very similar to previous studies of Haalpulaar migration: 
mainly domestic, the international migration is mainly African, and very few have left the 
continent. 44% of all migrations are domestic migrations, or migrations to the neighboring 
countries,  i.e. Mauritania, Mali,  Gambia  and Guinea. Dakar concentrates 77% of these 
„domestic‟ (Senegal or  neighboring countries) destinations. However, the capital city is 
often just a temporary stop on the way to further destinations. 38% of migrants went to 
another  African  country.  Most  of  African  migration  (73%)  is  directed  towards  Central 
Africa: Gabon, Congo, and Cameroon. There is a long tradition of Senegal River Valley 
migration in this area. There are accounts of „diamantaires‟ who made quite a good fortune 
in these countries
15. Côte d‟Ivoire has also been a frequent choice of destination, but since 
2000 because of the political instability, and xenophobic practices many have fled. 
In the end, only 18% of the migrants left the African continent (they represent 39 migrants): 
not surprisingly, most went to France (26 migrants). The USA is the second destination (9 
migrants) a few migrants being in Spain or Italy (5). The US is an increasingly attractive 
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destination, but this is still a recent phenomenon, so that the network is still weak, not to 
mention the cost of migration. During my field investigations, I met returning or visiting 
migrants  from  Germany  and  Denmark,  and  also  surprisingly  distant  destinations  like 
Australia  and  even  China!  Even  if  this  is  not  statistically  significant,  it  indicates  that 
diversification of destinations is used to circumvent tough migration policies. 
It is important to bear in mind that information about migrants is only second hand. I 
assumed the best information I could collect about them would be from the mother or the 
wife of the migrant. I also asked the brothers and the father if necessary. As a consequence, 
one common criticism to my findings is that low-rank migrants are simply not in a position 
to remit as they could not benefit from the network. This is rather difficult to find out from 
the  data  at  hand.  At  the  same  time,  a  recent  popular  saying  circulates  in  the  villages: 
“Migrations are blind to castes”. Indeed, among migrants outside the continent (mainly 
Europe-US), where expected earnings are higher, the proportion of non-notables is greater 
than the one of notables, and yet the proportion of notables is higher than non-notables to 
regularly remit. Figure 1 gives a more detailed picture of this phenomenon: 
Figure 1: Migrants’ distribution of destinations, and propensity to remit according to their notability 
 
 













non-notables notables  15 
Empirical Strategy 
 
The descriptive statistics evidence found in the previous section need to be checked „all 
things being equal‟. Hence, let us now turn to the regression results. 
Since  only  those  who  have  migrated  can  make  transfers,  a  two-step  Heckman  model 
generalized  for  probit  models  was  used  to  take  into  account  the  selection  bias.
16  The 
question is: do the ones with a higher probability of  being on migration have a higher or 
lower probability of remitting? As pointed out in the  appendix, no such effects are found: 
both decisions to migrate and then to remit are not correlated, which implies that these two 
regressions can be studied separately. 
Furthermore, since  there are  migrants from the  same families (up to 7 brothers ),  the 
correlation within the family was accounted for using a robust estimator of standard errors 
with family clusters. 
Regressions with different model specifications are displayed to show the robustness of the 




Probability of being on migration 
 
Several  model  specifications  are  displayed  in  table  2:  the  first  two  columns  aim  at 
identifying the relevant wealth variables, while the last ones identify the social status effect. 
In the last column, only significant variables are kept in order to avoid multi-colinearity 
problems. The main results are consistent throughout different model specifications.  
   
                                                 
16 Sometimes called „Heckit‟ model, with STATA it is the „hecprob’ procedure.   16 
 
Table 2: Probability of being on migration (marginal effects) 
On migration  1  2  3  4 
(adult son)             
age  0.065  0.073  0.074  0.072 
   (2.94)***  (3.69)***  (3.61)***  (3.54)*** 
(age)²  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
   (-2.51)**  (-2.98)***  (-2.97)***  (-2.90)*** 
Birth order  -0.003 
         (-0.13) 
      =1 if married  0.02 
         (0.32) 
      =1 if has ever been to formal school  -0.033 
         (0.48) 
      (patriarch) 
        Age  0.009  0.006  0.005  0.006 
   (1.23)  (1.14)  (0.9)  (1.16) 
Size of the household  0.008 
         (0.72) 
      Years spent on migration  0.008  0.008  0.008  0.008 
   (2.39)**  (3.00)***  (2.76)***  (2.91)*** 
=1 if receives a pension  0.025 
         (0.28) 
      =1 if has received bequeathable wealth  0.013 
         (0.67) 
      =1 if landless 
 
-0.118 
      
 
(-1.02) 
    =1 if doesn‟t possess any cattle 
 
-0.157  -0.177  -0.173 
  
 
(-2.21)**  (-2.55)**  (-2.47)** 
=1 if belongs to the “free man” caste 
   
-0.163  -0.142 
  
   
(-2.50)**  (-2.11)** 
=1 if belongs to a family with political power 
   
0.089 
           (1.42)    
Observations: 470; 147 clusters (families) 
        Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Nb: villages dummies are included in the regression, but not displayed (non significant) 
     17 
Overall this model correctly predicts 74% of migrating behavior. In contrast to previous 
studies, the number of migrating brothers appears not to be significant. In reality, there are 
two opposite effects: a network and a saturation effect. Having a brother can  facilitate 
migration: older brothers can finance their cadets, creating shifts of migrants.
17 On the other 
hand, when there are already migrants in the family, the patriarch may require other sons to 
stay to help him manage the household. Here it seems that both effects are neutralized. 
The age of the father has no  significant effect, but the older the son is, the higher the 
probability of being on migration, though with a decreasing effect, as the significantly 
negative squared age variable indicates. 
The fact that the having attended formal schooling is not significant is relevant to the fact 
that migrants do not need to hold literacy skills for the job they will find in migration. One 
must keep in mind that most migrants work in the informal sector, in Dakar and Africa, and 
in unskilled jobs in industrialized countries (mainly in the hotel or catering trades).  
Turning to variables capturing wealth of the family, they all seem to be not significant, but 
two. Firstly, the fact of owning cattle increases the  chance of being on migration. Second, 
the fact that his father spent many years on migration increases the chance of the son 
migrating. There are here 2 intertwined positive effects: a wealth and a network effect. All 
migrations are costly but especially for distant destinations: fares, bribing to get documents, 
or to get across the border safely. It usually represents far more than what a basic rural 
household can afford. Then there are some high costs of accommodation: even in Dakar 
renting a room has become very expensive.... Of patriarchs who have been on migration 
around 55% receive a pension. However the ones who did not get a formal job usually 
managed  to  invest  in  productive  activities  financing  their  own  sons‟  migration  and 
settlement. Consequently, it appears that sons of economically better-off families have a 
higher chance to migrate. Along with this wealth effect, there is a network effect: fathers 
who have been on migration have been able to build networks in their destination and 
acquire accordingly easy entry on some job markets. The best illustration of this is that 
many first migrants of this area started working in the hotel trade in Dakar, many at the 
                                                 
17 In French this is called „noria‟ (see Ba 1996: 30). This can no longer hold for destinations which have 
become very difficult to reach such as Europe...   18 
airport, then in France. Or even working as boy or cook for French colonizers who then 
took them to France to work for them. This result is in line with other studies. 
Finally, sons of families belonging to the higher castes are less inclined to migrate. This 
result contradicts Gubert‟s (2000) findings among Soninke: she found that only aristocrats 
migrate. It is necessary to turn to migrants remitting behavior to understand if migrants 
from high and low status have the same behavior once in migration. 
 
Probability of remitting 
 
Among the migrants, I turn now to their probability of frequently remitting. This model has 
a good predictive power as overall nearly 77% of migrants are properly predicted to remit 
or not. Table 3 displays five different model specifications. 
     19 
 
Table 3: Probability of remitting among migrants (marginal effects are displayed) 
 
Remitting  1  2  3  4  5 
(adult son)            
Ages  -0.004  -0.003  -0.004  -0.005  -0.005 
   (0.55)  (0.55)  (0.59)  (0.71)  (0.81) 
Borders  0.002         
   (0.07)         
=1 if has ever been to formal school  -0.223  -0.244  -0.244  -0.192  -0.198 
   (2.46)**  (2.55)**  (2.55)**  (2.07)**  (2.17)** 
Years spent on migration  0.017  0.015  0.016  0.016  0.018 
   (1.90)*  (1.63)  (1.68)*  (1.76)*  (2.00)** 
=1 if lives outside the African continent  0.361  0.371  0.372  0.378  0.377 
   (3.48)***  (3.84)***  (3.90)***  (4.34)***  (4.20)*** 
# of brothers on migration  -0.004         
   (0.13)         
=1 if one spouse lives with the patriarch  0.16  0.146  0.147  0.194  0.181 
   (1.72)*  (1.68)*  (1.69)*  (2.22)**  (2.05)** 
(patriarch)           
Age  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.018  0.017 
   (2.10)**  (2.60)***  (2.60)***  (2.45)**  (2.36)** 
Household size  0.001         
   (0.06)         
Years spent on migration  0.006         
   (1.54)         
=1 if has received bequeathable wealth  -0.018         
   (0.61)         
=1 if landless    -0.288  -0.291  -0.28  -0.281 
     (1.93)*  (1.95)*  (1.90)*  (1.94)* 
=1 if doesn‟t possess any cattle    -0.026       
     (0.25)       
=1 if belongs to Family of higher caste        0.111   
            (1.11)    
=1 if belongs to family with local power         0.234  0.257 
         (2.68)***  (2.99)*** 
Observations: 213; 102 clusters (families) 
Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Nb: villages dummies are included in the regression, but not displayed here (non significant) 
 
First, the age of the migrant appears not to be significant for his remitting  behavior. More 
surprisingly, the  size of the  patriarch  household has no impact on his probability of 
remitting. 
Some  expected  „wealth  effects‟  are  found:  data  on  the  migrant‟s  earnings  were  not 
available,  but  there  are  some  proxies.  The  time  spent  on  migration  appears  to  be   20 
significantly positive, which reflects the idea that it usually takes time for a migrant to 
obtain  a  secure  earning,  i.e.  regular  wages.  Similarly,  living  in  a  developed  country 
positively  affects  his  probability  of  remitting.  This  is  obviously  linked  to  the  higher 
earnings available there: he earns more than his own living expenses and can accordingly 
send back a part of his earning. 
Naturally, having a spouse who remained in the father‟s household increases significantly 
the probability of remitting. When turning to the strategic bequest motive, results similar to 
Hoddinott  (1994)  are  found:  if  the  father  owns  land,  it  increases  the  probability  of 
remitting. 
Surprisingly, no monitoring effects are found here: having brothers living in the same place 
of migration has no significant effect on his remitting behaviour. More surprising still, the 
number of years of completed formal schooling decreases the probability of remitting. This 
is  not  due to  sons  studying abroad, as  only  seven migrants  are actually  finishing their 
studies, which represents less than 3% of migrants. As shown in the appendix table A-2, the 
average years of schooling is very low: around two. But still, few years of formal schooling 
could be enough to acquire such basic skills as reading and writing, and lead to better job 
opportunity.  This  could  in  turn  give  the  migrant  more  incentive  to  settle  in  the  host 
destination, and cut ties with the hierarchical village society. 
Finally, central to the main point of this article: belonging to a politically powerful family 
in the village makes the migrant more likely to remit. Indeed, this status dummy variable is 
strongly  significant  at  a  1%  level.  Here  what  seems  to  be  central  is  the  fact  that  the 
patriarch  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  village  belonging  to  the  circle  of  influential 
notables. Indeed, belonging to the free born category is not precise enough, as this is a 
heterogeneous  category.  For  instance,  newly  arrived  free  born  families  may  not  have 
regained a dominant position in the village
18. On the contrary, a few families from the 
artisans or former slaves groups may have acquired a political position being linked  with a 
very prestigious family. 
 
                                                 
18. It is the case of many Mauritanian refugees (from the 1989 unrest) who despite being Fulbe have rarely 
gained a position as notable in their new Senegalese settlement.   21 
Other Supportive Evidence 
 
Unfortunately the lack of social status variables in other larger statistical surveys makes it 
impossible  to  compare  this  result  with  other  studies  so  far.  As  a  complement  to  the 
empirical evidence some other qualitative pieces of evidence which confirm the hypothesis 
made in this paper: some are listed here.
19 
To gain respectability in the village the most efficient way is to contribute to the building of 
a mosque. There are several anecdotes I heard during my stay in the valley, about the 
boycott of mosques built by migrant slaves. The Imam who is necessarily a noble, simp ly 
refused to lead the prayers... I heard a similar story about a well built by a successful slave 
that the nobles boycotted, opting for the more distant well. These anecdotes show that it is 
rather inefficient for a slave to invest in order to raise his r espectability in the village: he 
will always be considered as a slave and accordingly will be reminded to keep his low -
profile rank. The only way to get rid of these social stigmas is to migrate. In anonymous 
cities or foreign countries, he will more easily merge into society and be free in his acts. 
It is noticeable that during my repeated visits at different workers hostels, I met very few 
descendants of slaves or artisans
20. This is consistent, with reported cases of continuing 
discrimination against slaves on migration. The pattern is that slaves are excluded from any 
decision-making position in the migrant‟s association. Ba (1996) reports such a case in 
Cameroon (Ba 1996: 238). 
In Dakar, many people with Haalpulaaren names who do not speak Pulaar happen to be of 
slave or artisan origins. They seem to be the product of this melting pot. 
In many previous studies on migration among the Haalpulaaren it has been mentioned that 
the  desire  to  escape  from  rigid  social  constraints  were  among  the  main  motives  for 
migration. As they usually refer to the position of younger brothers willing to escape the 
tyranny of older brothers (see Platteau 2000), it could easily be extended to lower status 
                                                 
19 And others in French in Demonsant (2007). 
 
20 except the descendants of slaves of the village chief's family, which would tend to prove that former 
slaves of important families have some kind of respectability too.   22 
migrants. The study of Delaunay (1984) goes in the same direction as my results. He finds 
that  any  type  of  caste  can  be  found  among  the  migrants  from  the  Senegal  valley,  but 
recognizes that the former slaves are more likely to settle definitively, whereas the nobles 
go on temporary migration returning to the village, and sending remittances. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
These empirical findings suggest that migration is available to any social category, but for 
different aims: it can either be seen as an individual decision to escape from a poor social 
position with dire prospects in the village or, conversely, as a family decision to maintain 
its dominant local position. As a consequence, it is obvious that the first type of migrants 
will not be interested in investing in the development of the village but will benefit from the 
urban melting pot to get rid of their social stigmas. The good side of this is that they are 
factors of change as they move from a network-based to a modern market economy. In 
order to prevent rural exodus and urban concentrations, an efficient policy would be to 
invest in intensive consciousness-raising campaigns to get rid of the obsolete caste system. 
This will probably take time and be hard to implement as I found out that this was still a 
highly taboo subject in contemporary Senegal. 
Central  to  political  debates  in  France,  republican  values  of  racial  integration  and 
assimilation  may  differently  appeal  to  both  types  of  migrants  previously  described. 
France‟s model of integration aims to assimilate immigrants by instilling French cultural 
values. As a result, keeping strong ties with the country of origin is not well received. 
Accordingly, any attempt to assimilate the migrants of noble origins will fail. Indeed, they 
see themselves as temporarily migrant and have sound plans to return to the village. When 
returning they will genuinely keep silent their shameful subordinate occupations
21 while 
abroad and turn into powerful notables. Alternatively, the migrants from lower social 
categories will display strong motivations to fit in the host society. 
The aim of this study was primarily to draw attention to the local institutions when trying to 
understand migration in a non-western environment. Economists and econometricians too 
                                                 
21 I can witness that it is absolutely taboo to ask a visiting migrant about his job in the host country (or in 
the capital city). As one might guess such work was not prestigious, it is generally accepted to keep it silent... 
or to tell it only to a total foreigner away from other villagers!   23 
often draw conclusions from surveys that were lacking the social context. As this was a 
limited study, it would be interesting to pursue on a broader range. The recent World Bank 
book Culture and Public Action (Rao & Walton, 2006) sends a good signal that things are 
changing and that more and more cooperation between economists and anthropologists will 
be expected in the near future. 
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APPENDIX 
 









(free)  Toorobbe Lawakoobe or fileteebe   Temporal power 
   
Jangube or ardiibe diine  Spiritual power : ceerno 




Worgankoobe  Former monarchs: farba ceddo 
Kolyaabe  Koly‟s soldiers : jagaraf 
Mbonaabe 
Local variants of kolyaabe  Awgalnaabe 
Helgalagel, etc. 
Jaawambe  Courtiers and advisers: sooma 







Maabube sanyoobe  Weavers: jarno 
Wayilbe 
Baleebe  Blacksmiths: farba baylo 
Sayakoobe  Jewelers: farba baylo 
Sakkeebe 
Alawbe  Shoemakers: foosiri 
Wodeebe or garankoobe  Cobblers 
Lawbe 
Laade  Pirogue builders: kalmbaan 
Worworbe (bobi)  Kitchen tools‟ makers: maalaw 





Wambaabe  Traditional guitar players 
Maabube suudu Paate 
Singers  Maabube jaawambe 
Lawbe gumbala (kontimpaaji) 
Awlube  Griots genealogists : farba gawlo 
Jyaabe 
(slaves) 
Soottiibe (freed slaves) Maccube  Free but servile 
Halfaabe (dependants)  Maccube  Slaves and servants: jagodiin 
 
                                                 
22 Yaya Wane voluntarily excluded the stock breeders (in Pulaar: Pullo in singular / Fulbe in plural) from the 
Haalpulaar caste system.  
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Table A-2 : Descriptive statistics for the initial sample, the migrants and the remitters. 
 
  Initial Adult Sons (N=470)  Migrants (N=213)  Remitters (N=133) 





On migration  45%                       
Remitting          62%               
Age  30.8  8.4  17  61  33.2  8.1  17  61  34.5  8.5  18  61 
Age when leaving the household          27.4  8.3  3  50  27.8  8.3  11  50 
Birth order  2.6  1.6  1  8  2.4  1.5  1  8  2.3  1.6  1  8 
Formal schooling  36%        33%        27%       
Years of (formal) schooling  2.4  3.7  0  17  2.4  4.2  0  17  1.8  3.6  0  13 
Years on migration          6.1  5.7  0  25  6.9  5.8  0  25 
In migration for over 3 years          54%        66%       
Residing in a developed country          18%        26%       
Spouse (of the son) left in the household          41%        52%       
# of brothers already on migration  1.0  1.3  0  7  1.0  1.3  0  6  1.0  1.4  0  5 
# of brothers remitting          1.3  1.5  0  6  1.6  1.7  0  5 








Age of the patriarch  73.9  6.3  66  91  74.9  6.4  66  91  76.2  6.3  66  91 
Age of the patriarch when son migrated          69.1  8.4  42  89  69.5  8.4  42  89 
Number of dependants of the patriarch  7.6  3.8  2  17  7.4  3.7  2  16  7.0  3.7  2  16 
Family in region of migration          33%        32%       
# of years the father went on migration  10.6  12.9  0  47  13.9  14.2  0  47  15.0  15.1  0  47 
Family of higher castes  72%        66%        71%       
Local power of the lineage  42%        46%        56%       










Thiempeng  31%        28%        31%       
Bow  18%        15%        15%       
Thially  5%        5%        3%       
Galoyabe  14%        15%        16%       
Hombo  16%        18%        18%       
Thiambe  16%        18%        17%        
  28 
Table A-3: Probability of remitting conditional on being on migration: “Heckit” regression results 
1
st step: On migration : cf. (5) table 2 
2
nd step : Remit (conditional on being on migration) 
(adult son)   
Age  -0.008 
   (1.31) 
=1 if has ever been to formal school  -0.185 
   (1.93)* 
Years spent on migration  0.018 
   (1.94)* 
=1 if lives outside the African continent  0.342 
   (3.42)*** 
=1 if one spouse lives with the patriarch  0.177 
   (2.02)** 
(patriarch)   
Age  0.016 
   (2.01)** 
=1 if landless  -0.278 
   (1.96)* 
=1 if belongs to Family of higher caste  0.256 
   (2.85)*** 
Rho  -0.282 
Wald test H0:(rho = 0) chi2(1) =0.85  p-value= 0.3561 
Presenting only the most suited specification 
 
 